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THE PROGRESSIVE TRANSFORMATION OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
Class suits are a ready vehicle for social change, providing a
means to rectify the adverse effects of a complex array of corpora-
tions, associations and government agencies that complicate the
lives of common citizens. This article traces the evolution of class
actions in California, from 1850 to the present. The progressive
transformation of judicial response to class actions, from proce-
dural to remedial, will be discussed.
Originally, an exception to joinder requirements in common law,
early class suits were strictly limited to specifically predictable
situations. Contemporary cases, however, reflect a remedial view,
wherein the courts manipulate the boundaries of class actions to
provide a remedy for injured litigants. Within the remedial view,
evolutionary transition has brought class actions almost full circle
to the threshold of a new procedural outlook.
The application of judicial standards is necessarily an individual
endeavor, dependant upon the factual presentation of each case.
Yet, a definition and delineation of the parameters of proper rep-
resentative suits has emerged. These parameters must be shown
in order to avoid the frustration and the cost of a dismissal in fu-
ture suits. If class actions are to deal effectively with the demands
of society, it is imperative that the development of class actions be
well understood.
THE EARLY PROCEDURAL VIEW
A fundamental principle of common law was that all those with
a material interest in the subject matter of a lawsuit ought to be
joined as parties to the litigation. In the context of class actions
this compulsory joinder often thwarted the administration of jus-
tice, and compelled the courts to create exceptions to the general
rule.
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One such exception was promulgated by the California Supreme
Court, in the case of Von Schmidt v. Huntington.' There the court
allowed a bill to be brought by a few shareholders on behalf of
themselves and other shareholders for the return of forfeited stock.
The reasoning forwarded by the court was that an attempt to unite
all of the shareholders would be inconvenient, while the delays that
would develop from such an attempt would prove an injustice to
those already before the court.
The equitable considerations of convenience and justice were the
bedrock on which this early approach to class actions rested.2 As
a procedural mechanism, the class action suit enabled the courts
to cope with parties having an interest in the subject matter of a
suit, but who were too numerous to be effectively joined.
In 1872, section 382 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
was enacted. This section set out the common law rule of com-
pulsory joinder and outlined an exception for representative suits.3
One of the first cases to deal with the statute was Carey v. Brown,
4
where the court stated that the unity of interest between the rep-
resentative and those represented must be such as to make each of
them necessary parties to the action. 5 This pronouncement re-
stricted the use of class actions only to those situations where a
single transaction affected the class in the same manner.6
1. 1 Cal. 55 (1850).
2. Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. 612, 194 P. 1040 (1921); Noroian v. Ben-
nett, 179 Cal. 806, 179 P. 158 (1919); Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180 (1881);
Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531 (1860). For background to class actions,
see Note, Class Actions and Interpleader: California Procedure and the
Federal Rules, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 121-23 (1953); Note, Parties: Right to
Bring Spurious Type of Class Suit, 30 CALIr. L. REV. 350 (1942).
3. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (West 1973). The portion concerning com-
pulsory joinder has since been superseded by another section and therefore
deleted from this section by amendment in 1971. It read: "Of the parties
to the action, those who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiff
or defendant. .. ."
4. 58 Cal. 180 (1881). In an action by a landowner to quiet title against
a defendant who claimed the land adversely, the plaintiff was suing on be-
half of himself and all others who derived title from the same grantor.
5. Id. at 183-84.
6. "The only question involved in this action is one of title to the land
claimed by the plaintiff and the defendant adversely. It does not appear
that anyone had a common or general interest with the plaintiff in that
question. A judgment in his favor would simply quiet his title to land
in which no one else had any interest." Id. at 183.
Subject Matter-Single Transaction
The necessary party rule was the keystone to the single transac-
tion view. To find a single transaction, the courts needed to look
to the subjeot matter of the suit for the common interest of the
necessary parties. This approach provided a structural framework
for subsequent cases. Noroian v. Bennett7 is an example. In Nor-
oian, the plaintiffs were a group of farmers who claimed to be
victims of a fraud perpetrated by a company. The company prom-
ised the farmers certain benefits, including substantial credit al-
lowances, if they would purchase one share of the company by
signing a promissory note. The company assigned the promissory
notes to the defendant, who then sought to collect them. The
farmers found the shares to be worthless, and the credit was dis-
continued by the company.
Reasoning that a sufficient community of interest did not exist
because the promises were solicited from the farmers at different
times, the California Supreme Court refused to allow the issue of
fraud to be settled in one trial. The court stated that there was
no single fact which would "determine the rights of all the plain-
tiffs." The causes of action were similar, but the facts were not
the same.9 Examples referred to by the court demonstrated a ju-
dicial preoccupation with the single transaction approach. Those
owning ". . . separate rights in the water of a stream [and who] are
injured by a diversion of the water higher up on the stream by
another person, or where a single fraudulent conveyance operates
to the injury of several separate judgment creditors .... ."10 would
be proper parties for a class action. In Noroian, the court was un-
able to fit the plaintiffs into the necessary party mold, and for that
reason rejected the class suit.
A similar situation arose in Goodspeed v. Great Western Power
Co. of California,1 1 where the plaintiffs sought to represent users
of water supplied by the defendant. Allegedly representing that
it was a mutual company, the defendant required the consumers to
buy its stock. Although all the plaintiffs bought stock, they all did
not buy from the defendant. Therefore, the court determined no
single transaction occurred in which all of the plaintiffs were in-
volved in the same manner.
Other cases reiterated the interest of the courts in the singular
7. 179 Cal. 806, 179 P. 158 (1919).
8. Id. at 809, 179 P. at 159.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 19 Cal. App. 2d 435, 65 P.2d 1342 (3d Dist. 1937).
[VOL. 12: 186, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
characteristic of the wrong.12 As an exception to the j oinder re-
quirements, class actions were considered to be only procedural in
nature. The facts of each case had to fit the rule; the rule would
not accommodate any action inching over the drawn line. The com-
plaint had to fall within the judicial interpretation of section 382.
While maintaining the necessary party requirement, the court, in
Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mutual Water Co.,' 3 availed itself of a
companion concept-the common fund. The question before the
court was whether a complaint alleging separate fraudulant repre-
senations to a class of plaintiffs stated a cause of action. The de-
fendant company sold land to the plaintiffs and promised not to
charge for water service if the landowners would retain stock in
the company. Later, when the company levied a charge for its ser-
vices, a suit was brought on behalf of 1,500 stockholders. The court
of appeal refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed with the class
action because "[b] y no principle of legalistic logic does it appear
that the unnamed 1,500 are necessary to the prosecution by plain-
tiffs of their action."'1 4 The court also explained that there was a
lack of any common ground on which the class might rest. Ex-
plaining that "[a] representative suit is proper only where the ac-
tion is for the purpose of conserving a common fund .... , the
court based its decision on Carey and Balin. Yet emphasis on a
common fund as a possible alternative went beyond those two
cases. In a subsequent case,16 the court added impetus to the single
transaction approach and conspicuously allowed the subject matter
to be brought as a class action because the class had been using
water from a common source, which the defendant sought to re-
move. The court dismissed the defendant's argument that the
plaintiffs must allege a contractual relationship with it. Noting
12. See Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair, 43 Cal. App. 2d 884, 111 P.2d
753 (Super. Ct., App. Dep't. 1941). Defendant racetrack made errors in fig-
uring breakage, and plaintiff sued for all those who suffered loss thereby.
The court refused the action because injury to the plaintiffs occurred at
numerous times. See also Farmers and Merchants Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 5
Cal. 2d 601, 55 P.2d 867 (1936). Appropriation of funds deprived creditors
of payment.
13. 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (2d Dist. 1943).
14. Id. at 719, 137 P.2d at 762.
15. Id. at 718-19, 137 P.2d at 762.
16. Marolda v. La Piner, 81 Cal. App. 2d 742, 185 P.2d 40 (4th Dist. 1947).[Hereinafter cited as Marolda].
that the defendant had failed to raise any prior objections to a
-possible misjoinder, the court stated that Civil Procedure Code
section 382 precluded such objections on appeal.1 7 Nothing more
was said about necessary parties; the court rested its decision on
the concept of a common fund.
The court's seeming disdain for the necessary parties rule was
explained in the major case of Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of
Roses Association.)8 The court noted that Carey, Ballin, and Wat-
son demanded a collective interest.19 While agreeing that separate
and distinct claims would not be sufficient to maintain a class ac-
tion, the court disapproved the necessary party rule. With regard
to section 382, Justice Spence wrote:
The statute does not ... provide [that the represented group must
be so united with the named plaintiff as to make them neces-
sary parties] and such interpretation would restrict its appropriate
application in cases where 'many persons' or 'numerous parties',
though not necessary litigants, nevertheless have a 'common or gen-
eral interest' in the subject-matter of the controversy .... 20
The court destroyed the foundation of a single transaction ap-
proach to class actions, and signalled the pending doom of class
actions as mere procedural devices. No longer would the court be
able to look at the subject matter alone to determine ff a class ac-
tion could be sustained. Beyond community of interest, Weaver
did not expressly state what the new criteria for class actions would
be.2 ' In fact, by refusing to allow the action to be maintained,
the court emphasized that each of the plaintiffs had separate and
distinct actions. 22 By concluding that the defendant's refusal to
sell tickets did not affect all the plaintiffs in the same manner, the
court was unable to totally reject the single transaction approach.2 3
Weaver did not touch the concept of common fund and gave the
procedural device another, albeit temporary, chance to survive.
City and County of San Francisco v. Market Street Ry. Co.2 4 il-
lustrated the resiliance of the old view. There, the city was one of
17. Id. at 744, 185 P.2d at 42.
18. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948). [Hereinafter cited as Weaver].
19. Id. at 840, 198 P.2d at 518.
20. Id. at 841, 198 P.2d at 519. A later reaffirmation of this point is in
Heffernan v. Bennett and Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243 P.2d 846 (lst
Dist. 1952).
21. Note, Class Actions and Interpleader: California Procedure and the
Federal Rules, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 131 (1953); Note, Pleadings-Parties-
Representative Suits, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 285, 286 (1950).
22. 32 Cal. 2d at 839, 198 P.2d at 517.
23. Id.
24. 95 Cal. App. 2d 648, 213 P.2d 780 (lst Dist. 1950). [Hereinafter cited
as Market St. Railway].
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many parties having a cause of action against the railway com-
pany. When it became known that the defendant was liquidating
and distributing its assets without making any provision to pay pos-
sible judgments that might be levied against it, the city sued for it-
self and all others holding causes of action in order to prevent this
distribution. The defendant cited Watson as prdcedent and argued
that no common fund existed in which theplaintiff had a common
interest. The court, implying that no reason existed to allow the
defendant to benefit from its wrong, extended the concept of
"fund" to include the assets of the company.25 This ingenious ex-
pansion of the notion of "fund" allowed the single transaction ap-
proach to limp on for a while longer.26
A shift in emphasis was apparent. In the last three major cases, 27
the court abandoned the necessary parties rule, striking an event-
ually fatal blow to the importance of the single transaction concept.
Now, the common fund, as an alternative to necessary parties in
providing the required interest to sustain class actions, could no
longer bear the load. Besides convenience, judicial perceptions of
elemental justice also gave early class actions life.28 The narrow
confines imposed by procedural rules and an unyielding emphasis
upon the single transaction avoided the resolution of substanital
controversies. The important matter was to right wrongs and the
following case anticipated a broadened view of the class suit.
Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co.2 9 was a class action brought by
cotton growers on behalf of themselves and others similarly situ-
ated to recover cotton seeds wrongfully withheld by the defendant.
The normal practice was for the defendant to extract the seeds
from the cotton, weigh them and return them to the plaintiffs ac-
cording to a percentage formula based on the amount of cotton pro-
vided by each farmer. The plaintiffs alleged the formula was ma-
nipulated so that the defendant, Coberly-West, was able to retain
an "overage" illegally. 0
25. "Defendants claim that there is no 'fund' here. Strictly speaking that
is true. However, all plaintiffs would have a common interest in the total
assets of the railway company." Id. at 654, 213 P.2d at 784.
26. Price v. Communications Workers of America, 167 Cal. App. 2d 524,
334 P.2d 632 (2d Dist. 1959).
27. Marolda, Weaver, and Market St. Railway.
28. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55 (1850).
29. 151 Cal. App. 2d 72, 311 P.2d 33 (4th Dist. 1957).
30. Id. at 74-77, 311 P.2d at 34-36.
The defendant argued that a class suit could be sustained only
if its acts simultaneously created rights in a group of people and
that in this case the rights in question were individual in nature.
In essence, there was no single transaction between the defendant
and the group of farmers. The court compared the mass of seeds
contributed by the farmers to a fund and then, once and for all,
destroyed the final vestiges of the single transaction approach that
had been used since 1850. In the court's opinion,
[W]hether the primary wrong for which redress is sought is the
result of one act simultaneously affecting all the growers, or
whether it results from a series of similar acts which affect such
persons in the same way, is not the controlling element. In either
case, the result is the same insofar as the interest of each grower
is concerned and with respect to his right to relief.3'
Regardless of how it came about, the important factor was the
existence of a fund, or a common property interest. The court was
upset because the defendant breached its fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs. Just as in Market Street Railway, the court was willing
to create a fund out of the interests of the litigants, rather than
subjecting those interests to a mechanical framework. The court
wanted to be able to provide a remedy for those who were injured
by the continuous actions of the defendant.32
The willingness to dig about in the facts, to find the common
questions, to isolate them and to retain the action even for a por-
tion of them, became the foundation of the next approach. Class
actions were becoming good social policy-a way to correct massive
injustices by providing a forum for those who are wronged. It is
this expansive view of the subject matter of class actions, which is
so crucial today. Before going into the effects of this gateway to
accessibility, however, there is another important aspect of class
actions-the "class" itself.
"Class"-Pre-existing Groups
Early class actions isolated the class from the subject matter of
the suit. While the procedural perspective forced the single trans-
action to be a total approach, it also provided a similar status to the
determination of the class. Simply stated, the extent of the class
was defined by that characteristic which each of the members held
in common. More accurate, however, is the view that courts re-
fused to sustain a class action unless the "class" was a group that
31. Id. at 81, 311 P.2d at 39.
32. For a case where the court created a "fund" of sorts from the common
interest of the plaintiff in the validity of a statute, see Haggerty v. Kings
County, 117 Cal. App. 2d 470, 256 P.2d 393 (4th Dist. 1953).
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was discernible without the benefit of litigation. The theory dove-
tailed nicely with the single transaction view in that the defend-
ant's act could affect the group as a whole if the group pre-existed
and did not arise as a result of the wrong.
The earliest recital of the permissible extent of the class was in
Von Schmidt v. Huntington 33 wherein the court pointed out that
joinder would not be necessary if the parties formed a voluntary
association for public or private purposes. In that case, the plain-
tiffs represented stockholders of a company.3 4 Other groups, such
as creditors suing to obtain an accounting,35 or beneficiaries of a
trust seeking to remove a trustee" were easily recognizable by the
courts and could be dealt with as a unit. The major concern was
adequate representation. An action would not be allowed to con-
tinue if the rights of those who would be members, but as yet had
no interest, were to be foreclosed. 37 Designated members of a
class are bound by the judgment. Therefore, it is imperative that
the defined class be fairly and in good faith represented.3 8
Noroian v. Bennett39 demonstrated the interplay between the
single transaction approach towards subject matter and the pre-
existing group approach toward the class. The court spoke of a
numerous body of separate claimants seeking to settle litigation
on the weight of a single decisive fact, as a result of a single wrong
affecting the body as a whole.40 Without that single decisive fact,
the court could not accept the farmers as a class. The following
comparison of Goodspeed v. Great Western Power Co. of Califor-
nia,41 and Marolda v. La Piner4 2 helps illustrate this point.
In Goodspeed, those using water supplied by the defendant com-
pany were deemed to be unascertainable, whereas in Marolda, those
33. 1 Cal. 55 (1850).
34. Id. at 66; Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531 (1860).
35. Farmers and Merchants Nat. Bank v. Peterson, 5 Cal. 2d 601, 55 P.2d
867 (1936).
36. Peterson v. Donnelly, 33 Cal. App. 2d 133, 91 P.2d 123 (3d Dist. 1939).
37. Bernhard v. Wall, 184 Cal. 612, 194 P. 1040 (1921); Carey v. Brown,
58 Cal. 180 (1881); Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531 (1860).
38. Fallon v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 2d 48, 90 P.2d 858 (1st Dist.
1939). Intervenor, as member of class, sought to set aside the judgment
because of inadequate representation.
39. 179 Cal. 806, 179 P. 158 (1919).
40. Id. at 809, 179 P. at 159.
41. 19 Cal. App. 2d 435, 65 P.2d 1342 (3d Dist. 1937).
42. 81 Cal. App. 2d 742, 185 P.2d 40 (4th Dist. 1947).
using water from a common source were considered to be a proper
class. While the classes seem to be similar in each case, the lack of
a single transaction in Goodspeed blinded the court to the existence
of an identifiable group.
In Marolda, the class was easily discernible because the subject
matter was a single transaction, the deprivation of a common
source of water by the defendant. Under the procedural view, if
the class was neither pre-existing nor identifiable without the liti-
gation, or if the subject of the suit was not a single wrong perpe-
trated equally upon a recognizable group, the conflict presented
to the court could not be adjudicated by a class action.
The court seemed ready to depart from the pre-existing group
viewpoint in Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Associa-
tion.43 Explaining that a class need only to be ascertainable inso-
far as it relates to the matter in controversy, the court was poised
to loosen the strictures on the definition of class. However, the
creditors, stockholders, beneficiaries and bondholders alluded to as
examples were no different than the allowable groups of the pre-
vious seventy-five years.44 Without a single transaction, the class
was very narrowly and rigidly defined."
Obviously working against itself, the court dismantled the pro-
cedural device with one hand, while reassembling it with the other.
Cases such as Marolda, Weaver and Market Street Railway eroded
the relative isolation that had existed between class and subject
matter of a suit. Yet, the pre-existing group approach to class re-
mained alive, though somewhat scarred.46 The weight of social
policy would soon pull it down. Willingness to provide a forum
for those who had been wronged and the realization that class ac-
tions were more than a mere exception to joinder could not help
but to completely change the prior aproach.
The situation in Barber v. California Employment Stabilization
Commission47 helped liberalize the interrelationship between class
and subject matter in the hands of the court. The plaintiff in Bar-
ber, brought an action against the defendant alleging an improper
43. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
44. Id. at 839, 198 P.2d at 518.
45. The Weaver opinion intimated that the lack of a single transaction
affecting all the ticket holders doomed the action to failure. Had they been
a somewhat united group, the results might have been different.
46. Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellow, Etc., 39 Cal. 2d 121,
245 P.2d 481 (1952); Heffernan v. Bennett and Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d
564, 243 P.2d 846 (1st Dist. 1952); Maxwell v. Brougher, 99 Cal. App. 2d
824, 222 P.2d 910 (2d Dist. 1950).
47. 130 Cal. App. 2d 7, 278 P.2d 762 (1st Dist. 1954).
[voL. 12: 186, 1974) Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
refusal to grant unemployment benefits due to a maritime strike.
He was suing for himself and all other maritime workers similarly
situated. Though the court refused to recognize such an amorphous
class, it attempted to find a boundary that could be drawn to de-
fine the class. The court looked, not to the body of the class, but
to the facts. This attempt implied that a pre-existing body might
not be necessary if the subject matter is right.48
The decision in Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co.49 picked up where
Barber left off. The farmers in Fanucchi were not a pre-existing
body, but they were sufficiently ascertainable because of the com-
mon fund in which they all had an interest. Unlike the farmers in
Noroian, they were not hampered by the single transaction argu-
ment. While a throwback to an earlier time, the common fund
was formed by the common interests of the class members. In es-
sence, the class and the subject matter were coming closer and
closer together.
THE REMEIAL ViEw
The connection being forged between "class" and subject matter,
coupled with the expanding view of the courts as to the purpose
of class actions, would provide the springboard for the next judicial
response to this type of suit. No longer a mere procedural device
but a tool of social change, class actions could, and would be, used
to alter the status quo. The doors of the court were opened to all
who considered themselves to have been wronged. The courts,
anxious to provide remedies, began to sift through the facts of
each case with increasing care. Emphasis was placed upon find-
ing the common interest-the key to defining the proper subject
matter and determining the extent of the class.
Subject Matter-Multiple Transactions
Contrasted with the early procedural perspective, the drive to
supply a remedy provided the foundation for the second stage of
the evolving concept of class actions. The cornerstone of this
method remained the subject matter of the suit, but the predomin-
ating common questions were derived from multiple transactions
48. Id. at 15, 278 P.2d at 767.
49. 151 Cal. App. 2d 72, 311 P.2d 33 (4th Dist. 1957).
between plaintiff and defendant rather than from a single trans-
action. In Chance v. Superior Court,50 petitioners intervened and
objected to the representative nature of a suit filed to foreclose on
trust deeds that secured over 2,000 notes, because as members of
the class they feared loss of their property. Petitioners claimed
the class members lacked sufficient community of interest to allow
the action to proceed because the notes were sold in separate trans-
actions. In effect, the petitioners were attempting to use the old
single transaction approach that had been disallowed in Fanucchi.
The court admitted that a single transaction had not taken place
but then went on to determine interests the class had in common.
Explaining that the separate claims were not sufficient to preclude
the action, the court stated:
While the notes and trust deeds involved herein are separate; are
secured by allegedly separate parcels of property, and were ac-
quired ... in apparently separate transactions, there are also pres-
ent a number of questions common to all of these owners of notes
.... [A]ll of the trust deeds are identical as to the conditions
and provisions ... and all of the allegedly separate 'lots' are
situated within the same tract of land.... [I]t would not seem
necessary for each member of the instant class to establish his right
to recover ... upon facts peculiar to his own case .... G1
According to the court, all of the deed owners had a common
interest in resisting debtor status in relation to the defendant.
While the ideal class action would have no issues that were not
common to all members of the class, the common questions here
were sufficient to let the action proceed. If possible, the court in-
tended to provide a remedy.52
The petitioners also argued that no common fund existed. This
contention was a remnant of the single transaction approach. The
court explicitly disapproved the need for a common fund, stating
this element was nothing more than another way of expressing the
necessary community of interest requirement and that the exis-
tence of an actual fund was irrelevant.53
Finding that the relationships between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, as well as all the transactions between them are important,
the Chance court moved away from the strict procedural arena of
earlier cases. In order to provide a remedy for those wronged by
a common malfactor, the court had to elucidate the predominating
common question in every class action. Even the continuing in-
50. 58 Cal. 2d 275, 373 P.2d 849, 23 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1962).
51. Id. at 285-86, 373 P.2d at 855, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
52. Id. at 284, 373 P.2d at 853-54, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 766 (J. Patton mem-
orandum).
53. Id. at 288, 373 P.2d at 856, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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terests of the litigants became an issue possible of resolution with-
out repeated court appearances. 54 Willing to extend the benefits
of class actions, the court practiced an open-door policy.5 5 flius-
trative of this policy is Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.56
In Daar, the plaintiff represented all those who were passengers
in the defendant's cabs during the previous four years in order to
recover excessive charges made by the cab company. The over-
charging was due to the defendant's adjustment of the mileage
rate meter in its cabs. The subject matter of the suit was based
upon multiple transactions between the defendant and the plain-
tiff class. The court defined the predominating common questions
and clearly manifested its intention to do justice:
It is more likely that, absent a class suit, defendant will retain the
benefits from its alleged wrongs. A procedure that would permit
the allegedly injured parties to recover the amount of their over-
payments is to be preferred .... 57
The court was not adverse to tearing apart the facts and finding
the common questions, as long as the common facts, when weighed
against the individual claims, were predominant. Interested in
finding sufficient common facts to point to liability, the court in-
dicated that a general formula was not to be used, even though
inconsistencies may crop up in subsequent cases.58 Anticipating
the possibility of inconsistent results in future cases, the Daar
court promulgated a guidepost: If the burden to the court out-
weighs the benefit to the parties, then there is no reason to search
for a preponderance of common questions because the action can-
not proceed. The court noted that too many separate claims may
defeat the class action, but:
As we are not unmindful that substantial benefits resulting from
class litigation, both to the litigants and to the court, should be
found before the imposition of a judgment binding on absent parties
can be justified, our determination depends upon whether the com-
54. Renken v. Compton City School Dist., 207 Cal. App. 2d 106, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (2d Dist. 1962).
55. California Sch. Employees Ass'n. v. Willits Unified Sch. Dist., 243 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 52 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1st Dist. 1966).
56. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
57. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
58. Id. at 714, 433 P.2d at 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 737-38. For factual allega-
tions that establish the necessary community of interest.
mon questions are sufficiently important to permit adjudication in
a class action rather than in a multiplicity of separate suits.5 9
The vast changes wrought by the remedial view are apparent in
the following comparison. In an attempt to recover the amount
retained by a racetrack through the use of an erroneous figuring
scheme, the plaintiff in Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair0 sought
to represent all those who had bet at the track and were deprived
of their proper winnings. As was the situation in Daar, where the
defendant's meters were improperly set so as to result in a loss to
each cab passenger, the error made by the racetrack was the same
for each and every person in the class. Only the total recovery in
each instance varied. Using the single transaction approach, the
court in Ballin had refused to allow a representative suit, 1 while
the Daar court used a multiple transaction approach in allowing
the suit to proceed.6 2 The court in Ballin made no mention of the
defendant retaining the benefits of its wrong, but this aspect of the
case had been of paramount importance to the Daar court.0 8 The
Ballin case, preceding Daar by twenty-five years, was a victim of
the early procedural view, whereas Daar is the epitome of the mod-
em remedial view. By weighing the common facts against the in-
dividual facts with an eye toward the benefit to be conferred, the
court drastically altered the method by which the subject matter
of class actions would be perceived.
"Class": The Group Formed By The Wrongful Act
While the strict procedural view of single transactions gave way
to a remedial view, allowing multiple transactions where the sub-
ject matter was concerned, a similar change in the court's opinion
toward the class was also evident. The pre-existing group approach
is still viable,64 but the relationship between the extent and exis-
59. Id. at 713, 433 P.2d at 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 737.
_60. 43 Cal. App. 2d 884, 111 P.2d 753 (Super. Ct., App. Dep't. 1941).
61. Id. at 887, 111 P.2d at 756.
62. 67 Cal. 2d at 710, 433 P.2d at 742-43, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
63. Id. at 715, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
64. This manner of determining class extent is still the most efficient to
work with. It provides protection to the class, as well as to the defendants.
See California Gasoline Retail v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 844,
330 P.2d 778 (1958); Haggerty v. Kings County, 117 Cal. App. 2d 470, 256
P.2d 393 (4th Dist. 1953); Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P.2d 6
(1953). Note the relation between the association and the authority of the
representative to sue for the association. If the association, as an entity,
is not injured, but only the members are, then the representative must al-
lege he has the authority to represent. But if the association itself is in-jured, then this authority need not be alleged. See also Santa Clara County
Con. and Home Ass'n. v. City of Santa Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1st Dist. 1965).
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tence of the class, and the subject matter of the suit is of primary
importance. The predominating common questions provide factual
parameters to define the extent of the class. The link, between
subject matter and class, forged by Fanucchi grew stronger with
each case. In order for class actions to become an effective tool,
the definition of class must be flexible enough for varied use. The
important fact is that the named plaintiff, in his or her zeal to en-
force the rights of those allegedly injured, be a member of that
class. 65 Proper representation will assure the absent members that
their rights will not be foreclosed.6
None of the cases preceding Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. 67 allowed a
group of people allegedly wronged by the continuous action of a
defendant to stand as a class. The farmers in Noroian all held
promissory notes by which they could be identified; in Carey the
landowners all held deeds from the same grantor. The class in
Goodspeed held stocks from the defendant company and in Weaver
they held ticket stubs with a number issued by the defendant.
Yet, none of them were deemed an ascertainable class. In Bauman
v. Harrison,68 the defendant had the names of every bondholder
listed in its records, while the court in Price v. Communications
Workers of America, refused to allow a large number of individ-
uals, who might or might not have been interested in pursuing a
remedy, to be considered a class.69 The Daar court, however, ad-
vised that isolation of the class from the subject matter would no
longer be tolerated.70 There is no distinction between establishing
the existence of a class and identifying the class. As a group of
numerous persons who have been wronged or defrauded by an-
other party, the class arises from the wrong and need not exist
before the wrongful act. The interest in asserting the right to a
remedy gives the class shape and defines its outer reaches. Com-
mon questions must predominate over individual claims in order
65. Price v. Communications Workers of America, 167 Cal. App. 2d 524,
334 P.2d 632 (2d Dist. 1959); Kennedy v. Domerque, 137 Cal. App. 2d 849,
290 P.2d 85 (Super. Ct., App. Dep't. 1955).
66. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1967); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Ass'n, 32 Cal. 2d
833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948).
67. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
68. 46 Cal. App. 2d 84, 115 P.2d 530 (4th Dist. 1941).
69. 167 Cal. App. 2d 524, 334 P.2d 632 (2d Dist. 1959).
70. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
for the case to be allowed into court as a class action. Should
individual interests predominate,7 ' or the recovery by each mem-
ber be sufficient to warrant individual action,7 2 the benefit of the
class action to the litigants would be nil and the class non-existent
in the eyes of the court. Under the remedial view, the court would
endeavor to override factors that make the class action unattract-
ive if there would be a substantial benefit for all. "Thus, whether
there is an ascertainable class depends in turn upon the community
of interest among the class members in the questions of law and
fact involved."7 3 The "class" and subject matter of a representa-
tive suit were now opposite sides of the same coin.
THE SYNTHESis OF SUBJECT MATTER AND CLASS
Fraud had always been the nemesis of class actions because of its
highly individual nature,7 4 and this grated harshly against the
court's newly avowed purpose for class actions. In Vasquez v.
Superior Court,75 suit was brought by 37 named plaintiffs on be-
half of themselves and others who were residents of two counties
and who purchased frozen food and freezers from the Bay Area
Meat Company. The purpose of the suit was to rescind contracts
which were entered into after fraudulent misrepresentations were
made by the defendant to all of the members of the class.
Justice Mosk forcefully stated the reasons why class actions
should be used to protect consumers. Comparing the consumers'
plight to that of stockholders of thirty years ago, he said:
[C]onsumers as a category are generally in a less favorable posi-
tion than stockholders to secure legal redress for wrongs committed
against them. For these reasons, the desirability of consumers su-
ing as a class for fraud ... has [been urged].7 6
Noting that most consumers are powerless to protect themselves,
Justice Mosk implied that the procedural perspective of the past
was inadequate to cope with the inequality of resources in a battle
71. Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612
(1968).
72. Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71
Cal. Rptr. 269 (3d Dist. 1968). See also Czap v. Credit Bureau of Santa
Clara Valley, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1st Dist. 1970).
73. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
74. Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v. Parker, 265 Cal. App. 2d 204, 71
Cal. Rptr. 269 (3d Dist. 1968); Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mut. Water Co.,
58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (2d Dist. 1943); Goodspeed v. Great West-
ern Power Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 435, 65 P.2d 1342 (3d Dist. 1937); Noroian
v. Bennett, 179 Cal. 806, 179 P. 158 (1919).
75. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
76. Id. at 807, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
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between a consumer and a seller.1 7 "Substantial benefits both to
the litigants and to the court,178 will provide impetus for those
class actions on the borderline of acceptance by the court. Since
"[a] class action by consumers produces several salutary bypro-
ducts, including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge
in fraudulent practices . . .and avoidance to the judicial process
of the burden of multiple litigation . . . . ,79 the court was con-
vinced that Vasquez was the case in which the issue of fraud would
be vanquished. Very definitely, the court had no intention of let-
ting the defendants gain from their wrongdoing. It was imperative
that sufficient common questions be found to outweigh the indi-
vidual issues in order that the benefits of the resulting judgment
extend to as large a class as possible under the circumstances. The
court was relying on the foundation laid by Daar, but in the con-
certed effort to overcome the fraud issue, a variation was put forth.
The court delved into each element of the cause of action in order
to determine the predominating common questions in each.
As to the representations made to the plaintiffs, the court de-
cided:
[T]he salesmen employed by Bay Area memorized a standard
statement containing the representations . . . and that this state-
ment was recited by rote to every member of the class.8 0
The court also found that the existence of a formula, used by
the defendant to determine approximate food consumption, would
be sufficient commonality. The most important factor that the
court considered was that the plaintiffs be given the opportunity to
establish the necessary community of interest on the issue of mis-
representation.8 1
As to the reliance upon the misrepresentations, the court stated:
It is sufficient for our present purposes to hold that if the trial court
finds material misrepresentations were made to the class members,
at least an inference of reliance would arise as to the entire class.8 2
77. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
78. Id. at 810, 484 P.2d at 969, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
79. Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968-69, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800-01.
80. Id. at 812, 484 P.2d at 971, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
81. Id. at 813, 484 P.2d at 972, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 804; See also Louisell,
Miller & West, Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1041, at 1058, n.15 (1971).
82. 4 Cal. 3d at 814, 484 P.2d at 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
What was this purpose the court had in mind? The desirability
of this particular type of action provoked the court to make class
actions as available as possible, and to delay any final conclusive
judgment on the validity of the action until it becomes clear that
the sufficient benefits will not be derived. The court noted that
the Consumer Legal Remedies Act8 3 provided guidelines which
trial courts should make use of, especially ". . . for a hearing, upon
notice and motion, supported by affidavits, to determine if a class
action is proper .... ",84
The Vasquez case relied heavily on Daar. All those involved in
the same set of facts provided an ascertainable class. Separate
transactions were not important if sufficient common questions
existed, to outweigh the individual claims.85
proponents of class actions as a means of altering the status quo
began to take advantage of the liberalizing effect of the remedial
view.86 In Diamond v. General Motors Corp.,87 the named plaintiff
sued on behalf of all the residents of Los Angeles County, seeking
damages for air pollution, and injunctive relief to prevent the
293 named and 1,000 unnamed defendants from performing any
activity that would contribute to pollution. The damages sought
were over one billion dollars.
The court of appeal compared the case presented by the plaintiff
to the fact situations of Daar and Vasquez and decided that the
benefits of a group recovery were totally lacking. Viewing the
action as one for public nuisance, the court explained:
If we were to ignore the pleading problem and allow plaintiff to
come into court with a single general allegation, the trial court's
problems would be only beginning. Whether an individual has
been specially injured in his person will depend largely upon proof
83. CAL. Civ. CoDn § 1750 et. seq. (West 1973). See section 1781. This
in itself gives weight to the change in policy toward class actions, for the
only other area of California statutory law that allowed class actions was
section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
84. 4 Cal. 3d at 820, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
85. "[T]he applicable rule as stated in Daar is that the maintenance of
the suit as a class action is not precluded so long as the issues which may
be jointly tried, when compared to those requiring separate adjudication,justify the maintenance of the suit as a class action. If the questions which
must be litigated separately are not numerous or substantial, it would be
advantageous to the parties and the judicial system to allow the named
plaintiffs to sue on behalf of the class." 4 Cal. 3d at 815, 484 P.2d at 974,
94 Cal. Rptr. at 806 [emphasis added]. See also Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1st Dist. 1971); Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App.
3d'771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1st Dist. 1971).
86. See Labowitz, Class Actions in the Federal System and in California,
8 J. BEV. HiLLs BAR Assoc. 7 (1974).
87. 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (2d Dist. 1971).
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relating to him alone-going to such matters as his general health,
his occupation, place of residence and activities .... Thus the criti-
cal fact of injury would have to be litigated on distinct facts by
each of the seven million residents .... 88
The facts pointing toward liability were not common to the class
as was the fact situation presented by Daar and Vasquez. The
plaintiffs in Daar and Vasquez dealt with the defendant in an
identifiable series of similar transactions, but the plaintiffs in this
case aggregated individual tort claims. Delineating the reasons
why class actions had become such a popular remedial tool, the
court stated that, "[plaintiff's] position is that the present system
of statutes and administrative rules is inadequate, and that the
enforcement machinery is ineffective. '8 9
Neither rejecting nor accepting the plaintiff's argument, the
court refused to allow the action because of the lack of predominat-
ing common questions. In effect, the subject matter did not ade-
quately define the extent of the class. With few substantial bene-
fits to be had by a group recovery, the court was forced to use Daar
and Vasquez as a restriction rather than an expansion.
REsTRICTioN RATHER THAN EXPANSioN
Daar, Vasquez and subsequent cases, such as LaSala v. Ameri-
can Savings and Loan Association 90 and Beckstead v. Superior
Court,91 foreshadowed a policy of allowing the class action plain-
tiffs to have their suit measured on its merits to determine whether
the requisite benefits will flow from the action.
In Collins v. Rocha,92 the Supreme Court vacated an earlier court
of appeal decision9 3 because of the influence of Vasquez and al-
lowed an inference of reliance to exist in a fraud action because
the members of the class had an interest in determining the intent
of the defendant when he made the representations. The court em-
phasized that the representations were made at the same time to
all of the class. Numbering approximately forty, the class would
88. Id. at 379, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
89. Id. at 382, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
90. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
91. 21 Cal. App. 3d 780, 98 Cal. Rptr. 779 (2d Dist. 1971).
92. 7 Cal. 3d 232, 497 P.2d 225, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
93. Collins v. Rocha, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 90 Cal. Rptr. 224 (2d Dist.
1970).
benefit by having one action determine the defendant's liability.
The court felt it necessary to point out the influence of one act of
the defendant affecting the group as a whole, but nevertheless
continued to balance the elements of the cause of action as Vasquez
had done.
A similar method was employed by the court in Stilson v. Read-
ers Digest Association Inc.,94 a monstrous action with a class num-
bering at least 21 million. Suit was brought on behalf of all those
who had their name used without permission by the defendant in
connection with a sweepstakes. The court observed that the pre-
dominating common questions necessary to allow a class action
must refer to the liability of the defendant, but in Stilson, only
the singular claims referred to the liability of the defendant.
Therefore, in order to sustain the action, each member of the class
would have had to be able to show that he suffered mental anguish
as well as financial loss as a result of the defendant's act. There
were few benefits to be had by the plaintiffs, and because of the
unwieldy nature of the case, certainly none for the court.
Liberalization of class actions originated from the willingness of
the courts to provide a forum for those who were wronged to an
extent that would not be conducive to individual legal action.
When injured individuals can join together, with the egregious
behavior of the defendant as a point of unification, what was once
a relatively insignificant harm becomes a controversy of often great
proportions. When any group can coalesce the miniscule abrasions
that each and every one receives in life and rush to court demand-
ing relief, utilization of the judicial process often becomes impos-
sible. Courts are not equipped to cushion the mass of society from
shocks and blows of a complex world. Though segments of the
population are helpless to prevent interference by forces beyond
their reach, and despite disillusionment with the effectiveness of
legislated statutes, the court cannot do alone that which the whole
of society is unable to do for itself. The class suit is not a panacea
for the ills of an interdependent society and if misused it will ren-
der abuse and injustice on unsuspecting sectors of society to a de-
gree unparalleled in judicial history. Great care must be taken to
assure that class actions do not become a tool of destruction.
With this hazard in mind, the courts have, at least temporarily,
halted the expansion of class actions. The present trend is to place
emphasis upon the merit of the action and the relationship between
the representative and those represented.95 In Payne v. United
94. 28 Cal. App. 3d 270, 104 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1st Dist. 1972).
95. Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699, 109 Cal. Rptr.
254 (2d Dist. 1973).
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California Bank,96 the court would not allow the action to proceed
because the community of interest was not strong enough. The
allegedly wrongful act of the defendant must affect the representa-
tive in the same manner as the rest of the class so that a similar
situation exists between each concerning the subject matter of the
suit. This has the eerie ring of the old procedural view.
Daar and Vasquez were used restrictively in Devidian v. Auto-
motive Service Dealers Association.97 The plaintiffs sought to re-
cover damages resulting from a conspiracy to fix gasoline prices
two cents above the prevailing rate. The class was described as
all those who purchased gas from the defendants during the winter
of 1966-67, when the defendants were overcharging. The court paid
homage to Daar and Vasquez by stating, "... if the present case
bears any substantial similarity to those cases we are bound to
reach a similar result .... ,98 and then proceeded to explain why
Devidian was unlike either of them. Due to the impact of Diamond
and Stilson, the court was wary of large classes.99 Daar had many
members in the -represented class, but had only one defendant.
Vasquez had 200 members and only three defendants. Devidian
had approximately 1,000 defendants. Furthermore, Daar involved
only a single computation of a single price differential-while Vas-
quez may have had more complex factors, the recovery was over
$1,000 for each plaintiff.100 In Devidian, however, the court ex-
pressed concern over the difficulty in determining the amount of
the overcharge to each class member. The possibility of 265 million
transactions was overwhelming. 1 1 Relying on Stilson as authority,
the court advised that Daar and Vasquez do not allow plaintiffs
to burden the court. "[A] class action must be viewed in light of
the problems its institution creates for the courts."'10 2 The multi-
ple transaction approach to subject matter, as espoused by Daar
and Vasquez, takes into account the complexity of interactions be-
tween the parties. If predominating common questions define the
96. 23 Cal. App. 3d 805, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1st Dist. 1972).
97. 35 Cal. App. 3d 978, 111 Cal. Rptr. 228 (5th Dist. 1973).
98. Id. at 981, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
99. The court discovered, through population and census figures that the
class would not be less than 265,000.
100. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 981, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
101. Id. at 984, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
102. Id. at 985, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
extent of the class, the court in Devidicn had no reason to find the
class unascertainable. The remedial view provides a plaintiff with
every opportunity to prove his allegations. 03 Nonetheless, the
court refused to allow the action.
By separating class and subject matter, the court resurrected
confinements reminiscent of the early procedural view of forty
years before. The court could find neither a single transaction nor
a pre-existing body within which the components of this action
would fit.
After twenty years of expansion it is disappointing to discover
cases such as Daar and Vasquez being used restrictively. The
Devidian decision concerned itself with matters beyond proof of
liability. The common interest of the class extended at least as far
as the overcharging at a constant rate by the defendants. As de-
fined by that allegation, the class was no more ephemeral than the
class of taxi riders in Daar.
The shift in judicial emphasis after Vasquez is becoming appar-
ent. Benefits of litigation must extend beyond the needs of the
plaintiff, to the court. This was not the attitude before Vasquez.
CONCLUSION
Temporary stagnation of the remedial view has occurred since
the Vasquez decision. If blame is to be assigned for this develop-
ment, class action litigants must share a greater burden than the
courts. Overzealous representatives often fail to appreciate the po-
tential destructiveness of the class action suit. Almost impossible
demands made upon the court have had the effect of dampening
remedial enthusiasm.
As of yet, the full effect of the suggestion, in Vasquez, that the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act'0 4 be used as a guideline has been
indeterminable, though it recently has been used as a framework
within which the action must fit.10 5 The manipulation of concept-
ual boundaries, so characteristic of the remedial view, has given
way to a more formalized approach. Each element of the cause of
action must contain sufficiently predominant common questions in
order for the suit to be allowed into court as a class action.l00 The
103. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,
67 Cal. 2d 695.
104. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(b) (West 1973).
105. Petherbridge v. Altadena Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n., - Cal.
App. 3d -, 112 Cal. Rptr. 144 (4th Dist. 1974); Phillips v. Crocker-Citizens
Nat. Bank, - Cal. App. 3d -, 113 Cal. Rptr. 688 (2d Dist. 1974).
106. Anthony v. General Motors Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 699; Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800.
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complaint must allege facts that make it reasonably, 10 7 if not sub-
stantially, 08 certain to win. The evolutionary process seems to
have come full circle. The law is on the verge of a plateau stage
in the development of class actions: The threshold of another pro-
cedural era, replete with restrictions and confinements.
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